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Professor DeGrazia argues that (1) we may give the 
interests of humans and animals equal considemtion, 
(2) that this considemtion does not entail that humans 
and animals have equal moml status, and (3) that 
humans do have higher moral status than animals. He 
concludes that the use of nonhuman animals in research 
is ethically justified. His position does not differ 
significantly from that of Frey. Both avoid the 
appearance of speciesism by providing a supposed 
objective criterion of moral worth. Both appeal to 
intuition to support such a criterion. 
I find DeGrazia's position implausible for three 
reasons: fIrst, it cannot be put into practice; second, 
intuitions differ and cannot be used as a ground for 
assuming that humans are more worthy than animals; 
and third, the plausibility of his view depends on 
accepting a fmrnework that is generally destructive 
oClife. 
My comments will be restricted to two of his 
contentions; frrst, that differences in moml status appear 
with regard to the interest of freedom and second, that 
differences in moral status appear most vividly with 
respect to life. As he points out, this position is not 
uncommon. Singer claims that the rejection of 
speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal 
worth. Most philosophers contend that human life is 
more valuable than animal life, and that some animal 
lives are more valuable than other animal lives. 
DeGrazia contends that captivity would generally do 
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more violence to a human's plans than it would to the 
totality of things an animal would want to do. One 
should therefore prefer the use of animals over humans 
in freedom-restricting research. The death of a human, 
he says, thwarts more interests, and more important or 
central interests, than the death of an animal. He 
presents no evidence for these contentions, does not 
tell us what sort of animals humans are being compared 
to (except birds and dogs) and adds a value judgment 
that does not follow even if the premises that humans 
have more interests is true. 
That human plans or interests are more important 
and central than animal interests is a statement that I 
am at a loss to comprehend. DeGrazia is careful to 
point out that the premise is "generally true," Le., that 
some humans, e.g., "the very old, the retarded, do not 
always have plans that are so badly thwarted by 
captivity, while birds may be completely frustrated." 1 
am not sure whether this type of theorizing involves 
empirical variables or exactly what DeGrazia would 
propose to do on the basis of empirical research into 
the thwarting of freedom. Do we construct a hierarchy 
ofresearch animals based on the frustration ofcaptivity? 
Do we select an elderly person or a retarded person 
mther than a bird? Do we select by how important we 
think a person's or animal's plans are? This may be 
non-speciesist, but I have never understood how 
philosophers can be comfortable with such a position. 
DeGrazia asks the sceptic to consider all the things 
she wants to do in the next fIve days. 1 take it as far 
from obvious that humans, in general, do more various 
kinds of things than animals. More than half of the 
world's human population is so poor that they have very 
few plans other than seeking food, shelter, and medical 
care. They do not have freedom of mobility, freedom 
to choose what, or whether, they will eat. Most domestic 
dogs and cats have a "richer" life than most humans. 
Are we to conclude that these people should be used as 
experimental subjects rather than such animals? 
DeGrazia indicates that this type of objection may not 
be credible. By "humans," he says, "I mean normal 
humans." Although he does not carefully define 
"normal human," the sick, the starving, the elderly, the 
retarded, and the handicapped would probably not 
qualify as "normal." I fmd it highly objectionable to 
conclude that "normal" people have a higher moral 
status than those deemed not normal. 
The life of domestic dogs is usually compared to the 
life ofnormal humans. Captivity, says DeGrazia, would 
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generally do more violence "to a human's plans than it 
would to the totality ofthings the dog would want to do," 
as though the dog were not already captive. Since, in 
general, white males tend to do more various types of 
important things than blacks and women, we might as 
well conclude that they have a higher moral status. 
We may deem some interests to be more important 
than other interests, but I doubt that this is based on 
any objective criterion. To consider our own interests 
and opportunities more important and central in some 
cosmic sense is an elitist position that I cannot defend. 
To contend that normal people have a higher moral 
status than people who are not normal, to refer to such 
people as defective or as marginal cases, to contend 
that some animals have a higher moral status than some 
people, is, I think, the height of egotism. To suggest 
that the interests of a normal dolphin may be more 
important than those of an elderly, retarded human is 
an affront to human dignity. To contend that this is all 
very objective and based on detached reflection is to 
fool ourselves; philosophers give a sceptical eye to 
scientists who make such claims. That we are not 
dealing with pure objectivity is evidenced by the 
constant appeal to intuition. 
DeGrazia points out that the intuition persists that 
the killing ofa human is more destructive of something 
objectively valuable than the killing ofan animal. What 
kind of intuition is this? My guess is that it is based on 
a long history of speciesism, based primarily on our 
desperate desire to be important and powerful in a 
universe that cares as much about us as it does a flea. 
The terms "higher moral status" and "higher value" are 
usually connected to some capitalist idea ofproductivity 
and usefulness to those in power. That our total 
obsession with hierarchies and ranking is destructive 
to all life has been demonstrated in numerous works. 
Giving all sentient beings equal moral status would 
not solve the ethical dilemmas with regard to extreme 
cases. We are all worried about a philosophical frame-
work which would throw us off a lifeboat. I would not 
throw a human being overboard in favor of a dog, not 
for DeGrazia's reasons, but simply because I selfIshly 
value humans more. I do not believe that our choices 
in these situations are justified by any ethical theory. 
Response 
David DeGrazia 
Let me briefly respond to Professor Squadrito's 
thoughtful commentary on my paper. Space precludes 
treating all of the objections, and I will honor none of 
the ad hominem remarks. To begin, I did not conclude 
that the use ofanimals in research is justified. The thesis 
was conditional and took this form: If research that 
harms animals is to be done at all, then such-and-such 
is, generally, a reason to prefer the use of animals over 
humans. For all I have asserted, Regan's view might 
be right, for it is compatible with the claim that normal 
humans and normal animals differ in moral status; 
indeed, his view implies this thesis with respect to life-
interests. The truth is that I think a range of views are 
within reason and that each view within this range is 
compatible with the theses I advance, but I do not know 
which is correct 
Additionally, to be precise, I did not even argue that 
humans generally have greater moral status than 
animals, but rather that there is good reason to think so. 
This more modest claim is in keeping with my purposes, 
because my major objectives are (1) to distinguish the 
concepts ofequal consideration and equal moral status 
and (2) to prove that the principle ofequal consideration 
does not entail equality of moral status. These 
objectives are accomplished if it is shown that there is 
good reason to think there are differences in moral status 
while assuming the principle of equal consideration. I 
fmd it odd that Squadrito never comments on my two 
major theses. 
However, I do, in fact, believe that there are 
differences in moral status. To deny this thesis is to 
accept fairly staggering implications, e.g., that there is 
no more reason, ethically, to save a human person in a 
"lifeboat situation" than to save a trout-that, given an 
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